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DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION. By Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 291. $19.95. 
Educational policy is simultaneously a subject of great dispute and 
of unparalleled significance. More than preparing children to "func-
tion in society," education shapes the attitudes and preferences of fu-
ture citizens. In a democratic society the views of citizens become the 
policies of a nation, and for this reason education has the potential to 
determine America's political future. Amy Gutmann 1 recognizes this 
power and in Democratic Education proposes a theory of education 
which distributes educational authority in a manner she believes to be 
consistent with democratic government. 
Gutmann contends that a comprehensive theory of education is 
necessary if citizens are to assess and judge policy options. Rather 
than arguing in favor of any particular vision of the morally ideal edu-
cation, Gutmann attempts to answer the following question: Who 
1. Amy Gutmann is an Associate Professor of Politics at Princeton University and the au-
thor of LIBERAL EQUALITY (1980). 
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should make educational policy? She asserts that these policy deci-
sions should be the result of democratic consensus. Educational prac-
tices must reconcile the competing claims of parental authority, 
responsible citizenship, and individual liberty. She concludes that 
political majorities should decide educational policy as long as that 
policy is not repressive or discriminatory. Gutmann's theory of educa-
tion additionally requires that future citizens be taught the skills and 
values necessary to democratic processes. Schools must teach these 
abilities not only because our society values democratic methods, but 
also because future citizens will have to make democratic decisions 
about the education of the next generation. 
Chapter 1 explains and defends the theory against more traditional 
views. Gutmann goes on to consider the implications of her principles 
and to refine them by evaluating their practical consequences. She ac-
complishes this "translation of political principles into practice" (p. 
17) through a discussion of the democratic purposes of primary 
schooling (ch. 2). Gutmann uses this "groundwork" for consideration 
of the dimensions of democratic participation (ch. 3), the limits of 
democratic authority (ch. 4), and the distribution of primary schooling 
(ch. 5). She then applies democratic principles to higher education 
(chs. 6 and 7), educational institutions other than schools (ch. 8), and 
adult education (ch. 9). She concludes by showing how democratic 
education is consistent with the assertion that politics is a form of edu-
cation. While Gutmann provides a comprehensive discussion of edu-
cational policy, her conclusions are not always consistent with the 
democratic theory she advocates. A detailed explanation of her theo-
retical development and an analysis of her conclusions demonstrate 
this weakness. 
In chapter 1 Gutmann begins her explication of democratic educa-
tion by considering three traditional views of the control of education. 
She rejects each in tum but takes principles from each which help 
forge her democratic theory. She describes these alternatives as the 
family state, the state of families, and the state of individuals (p. 22). 
The family state seeks to foster a "like-mindedness and camaraderie 
among citizens that most of us expect to find only within families" (p. 
23). All members are educated to accept the single, "correct" vision 
of the good life. 2 State control oyer education is absolute and its aim is 
to inculcate in children a desire to pursue the true good life rather 
than other inferior alternatives. Gutmann rejects the family state be-
cause, even if there is such a thing as the good life (which she doubts) 
(pp. 28, 44), parents and citizens have differing conceptions as to what 
2. For discussion of the "family state" approach see PLATO, Crito, in THE LAST DAYS OF 
SOCRATES (H. Tredennick trans. 1969); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (B. Jowett trans. 1941); B. WIL-
LIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985); B. WILLIAMS, The Truth in Relativ-
ism, in MORAL LUCK (1981); K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966). 
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constitutes a just society for them and their children. Adult citizens 
who have not yet discovered the good life, have a right to try to perpet-
uate their vision. For this reason they are entitled to a share of educa-
tional authority which undermines the state's claim to total control. 
The state of families is at the opposite extreme. 3 It places exclusive 
responsibility for education in the hands of parents. They may thus 
predispose their children to choose a way of life consistent with their 
preferences. Gutmann condemns the insulation of children from ex-
posure to different attitudes and preferences. Rather, an education 
must develop the ability to choose among competing conceptions of 
the good life. Since children are members of both families and the 
state, both have a claim to educational authority.4 
While the family state and the state of families justify instruction 
that biases children towards some conceptions of the good life, the 
state of individuals demands absolute neutrality in the teaching of val-
ues. 5 It supposes that all understandings of the good life are valid and 
that education should not bias children toward any particular view. 6 
Educational authority in the state of individuals should be exercised 
exclusively by professional educators who not only must avoid bias, 
but also must teach the skills necessary to individual choice among 
differing conceptions. Gutmann's criticism of this view of educational 
control is that we value education not just for the liberty of choice that 
it encourages, but for the virtue that it bestows on children. Society 
has an interest in predisposing children to only a select r~nge of 
choices that will allow them to flourish and function in a democratic 
society. Additionally, she notes that neutrality among virtues is itself 
controversial. Indifference among virtues offends supporters of moral 
education as much as instruction in only one view of the good life 
represses those who favor a different view.7 
3. For discussion of the "state of families," see M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 
(1962); J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL 
(1978); Schrag, The Right to Educate, 19 SCH. REV. 359 (1971); c. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 
(1978); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Second Treatise) (P. Laslett rev. ed. 
1963); N. TARCOV, LoCKE'S EDUCATION FOR LIBERTY (1984). 
4. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Supreme Court consid-
ered the state's interest in having all of its citizens reasonably well educated so that they could 
participate in political affairs and become economically self-sufficient. However, that interest 
was not sufficient to deny the rights of the Amish to the free exercise of their religion. Thus the 
parent's claim to educational authority overrode the state's interests. 
5. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980), for a defense of 
liberal neutrality. 
6. For discussion of the "state of individuals" seeJ.S. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, 
LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (E.P. Dutton ed. 1951); I. KANT, THE EDU· 
CATIONAL THEORY OF IMMANUEL KANT (E.F. Buchner trans. 1904); B. ACKERMAN, supra 
note 5. 
7. Gutmann has changed her views on this approach to education. At one time she favored 
only those educational techniques that maximized the future freedom of children. See Gutmann, 
Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 338 (1980). 
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Gutmann finds none of the three traditional views satisfying. The 
problem remains: education cannot and should not be morally neu-
tral. How then should society determine which values to teach future 
citizens? Gutmann first defines an inclusive ground on which to jus-
tify non-neutral education - a commonly held virtue broad enough to 
permit differing views of the good life to flourish. That virtue is a 
commitment to "conscious social reproduction." She states, "We are 
committed to collectively re-creating the society that we share. 
Although we are not collectively committed to any particular set of 
educational aims, we are committed to arriving at an agreement on 
our educational aims .... " (p. 39). Therefore, while education cannot 
avoid biases towards some conceptions, differing views of virtue, the 
good life, and moral character can coexist within the notion of con-
scious social reproduction. The principle leaves room for citizens col-
lectively to shape education in their society. Each view may be put 
forward in the democratic process, and while those preferred by the 
majority will be favored in our schools, no view may be repressed. At 
the same time all children must be educated so that they can share in 
consciously reproducing their society when they become adults. Fu-
ture citizens must learn the skills that allow them to represent their 
views in the democratic process and the attitudes that make them tol-
erant of differences as well as democratic outcomes. 
Democratic education combines many aspects of the three tradi-
tional approaches which Gutmann rejects. Educational authority is 
shared by the state, parents and professional educators. Like the fam-
ily state a democratic state seeks to teach a societal virtue - the dem-
ocratic virtue of conscious social reproduction, which aims to 
predispose children towards those values consistent with the sharing 
of rights and responsibilities in a democratic society. Like the state of 
families, the democratic state recognizes that parents have an interest 
in shaping the education of their children, but only within the limits 
set by democracy. Like the state of individuals, a democratic state 
favors participation of professional educators in developing choice 
among "good lives." But it is the ability to evaluate these choices and 
to appreciate moral values common to this society that democracy re-
spects, not the neutrality among all moral views that is the basis of the 
state of individuals. 
The primary purpose of democratic education is to develop what 
Gutmann calls "deliberative" or "democratic" character. Nurturing 
democratic character involves two crucial components. First, schools 
must teach moral reasoning; second, they must inculcate moral char-
acter. Moral reasoning includes thinking critically about authority 
and permits future citizens to evaluate competing moral claims and 
choose among them. Consequently they can understand their own 
preferences and participate in developing social preferences. Moral 
character, on the other hand, fosters behavior in accordance with au-
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thority (p. 51). Society has an interest in perpetuating certain moral 
values. Schools must teach these values, but only in conjunction with 
instilling the ability to think critically about the moral appropriateness 
of authority. 
While Gutmann favors a democratic procedure for choosing 
among programs of moral education, there are two limits on the dem-
ocratic authority that she advocates. The first, nonrepression, pre-
vents society from restricting rational deliberation among competing 
conceptions of the good life. The second, nondiscrimination, prohibits 
society from excluding educable citizens from adequate education. 
Both are essential to conscious social reproduction and both prevent 
the majority from implementing educational policies that are 
undemocratic. 
Throughout the work, Gutmann uses her democratic theory to 
consider numerous contemporary educational controversies. For ex-
ample, in chapter 5 she considers the distribution of primary educa-
tion and the funding of public schools. Her funding formula calls on 
the state to identify schools that provide an adequate education. In 
order for demO"cratic education to be adequate, it must do more than 
produce functionally literate students who can find employment; it 
must also demand from students the ability to think about democratic 
politics, and must develop deliberative skills so that future citizens can 
effectively participate in conscious social reproduction. Gutmann de-
fines this level of education as the "democratic threshold." Once the 
state identifies schools which produce children at the democratic 
threshold, it must then increase funding to inadequate schools such 
that they can meet this level of education. All funding above the dem-
ocratic threshold is a matter of democratic discretion. But she also 
envisions a nondiscretionary element to funding decisions. Implicit, 
but never defended, is the assumption that increased funds will permit 
all schools to provide a democratically satisfactory education. 
Gutmann considers additional controversies through her demo-
cratic analysis including bilingualism (ch. 3), book banning (ch. 4), sex 
education and sexist education (ch. 4), the role of private schools (ch. 
4), school desegregation (ch. 5), the purpose, funding, and admissions 
practices of institutions of higher education (chs. 6 and 7), the educa-
tional role and permissibility of government regulation of libraries and 
television (ch. 8) and adult education (ch. 9). The theory comfortably 
answers many of the vexing, current educational problems. However, 
her answers do not always appear consistent with her democratic the-
ory; ultimately they may only justify her own moral preferences. 
The incongruity between theory and application may follow from 
the fact that while Gutmann proposes a procedure to make educa-
tional policy, her procedure is not principle-neutral. The biases of her 
theory result from the contention that one of the purposes of educa-
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tion is to instill certain moral attitudes. Evidently these attitudes 
should be democratically determined. But while education can be 
biased towards values favored by the majority, it should follow from 
her theory that the process itself should be morally neutral and should 
permit the teaching of any values which are not repressive or discrimi-
natory. The difficulty is that the bases of her democratic analysis are 
the "deepest, shared moral commitments" of American society. 8 For 
Gutmann these appear to involve adherence to traditional liberal val-
ues. 9 Yet she is unable to separate the kind of education her theory 
would produce from the values of her theory of educational authority. 
Although her theory of decisionmaking should permit a broad range 
of outcomes, her values infect the process. In essence Gutmann uses 
notions of our "deepest, shared moral commitments" manifested 
through the principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination to sup-
port her own moral preferences. 
Her preferences are most noticeable in the case she makes against 
the teaching of creationism in public schools. She contends that 
schools are prevented by the principle of nonrepression from teaching 
creationism even if the subject is favored by a democratic majority. 
The principle is violated by the indirect imposition of the religious 
views of some on all children in the guise of science (p. 103). She finds 
that the indirect "result of establishing religion in public schools 
would be to restrict rational deliberation among competing ways of 
life" (p. 104). She assumes that religious attitudes are intolerant of 
differences and that the idea of creationism cannot be taught without 
restricting opposite views. But this does not on its face appear to be 
the case. It seems possible at least that creationism could be taught as 
an alternative, even if unconvincing, view in addition to the theory of 
evolution. Of course, schools would also have to develop the reason-
ing skills necessary for each child to make a choice, but it does not 
follow that the choice is restricted by the introduction of a competing 
conception of human origin. Gutmann lets her biases show when she 
suggests that schools are bound not "to teach false doctrines that 
threaten to undermine the future prospects of a common democratic 
education" (p. 103; emphasis added). She thus would prevent the 
teaching of a doctrine with which she disagrees on the grounds of 
"nonrepression." 
Her probable response to this suggestion would demonstrate the 
problems discussed above. She states, the case against the teaching of 
creationism "rests instead on the claim that secular standards consti-
8. P. 21. Gutmann looks to "the most commonly held theories concerning educational pur-
poses, authorities and distributions" in order to develop her own theory. 
9. Gutmann admits the need to "use some form of philosophical analysis to defend a set of 
principles or to determine which set of principles and whose interpretation of them ought to 
rule." P. 21. 
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tute a better basis upon which to build a common education for citi-
zenship than any set of sectarian religious beliefs - better because 
secular standards are both fairer and a firmer basis for peacefully rec-
onciling our differences" (p. 103). Her prohibition of religious instruc-
tion is consistent with the admission that her theory rests on principles 
drawn from our deeply held common values. America has a long his-
tory of the separation of church and state. However, if democratic 
authority is limited only by nonrepression and nondiscrimination, it is 
difficult to resist a majority decision to teach creationism in the 
schools. It appears at least possible to teach creationism in a manner 
which does not limit consideration of other views of the good life. If 
educational authority truly conformed to the theory Gutmann pro-
poses, it would have to allow creationism in schools if favored by a 
majority. But as it appears that deeply held common values can also 
trump democratic decisions, how these "values" are defined deter-
mines educational content. The problem for Gutmann is that these 
values are not set by democratic process. 
It is because many will find Gutmann's version of our deeply held 
common values intuitively satisfying that Democratic Education will 
be most appealing to an American audience. 10 Gutmann's principle of 
conscious social reproduction justifies democratic control over educa-
tional authority, limited only by the principles of nonrepression and 
nondiscrimination. Gutmann would claim that by "conscious social 
reproduction" she means the fostering of the ability in future citizens 
to deliberate about moral alternatives and arrive at a societal consen-
sus. However, given the extent to which her theory is shaped by cur-
rent, American, liberal values (which, for her, represent our deeply 
held common values), Gutmann underestimates the significance of the 
"reproduction" component. Future citizens who have had democratic 
educations will favor the reproduction of the society of the previous 
generation. Although Gutmann's theory permits the teaching of radi-
cal visions of the good life, it appears unlikely to create future citizens 
who will desire to implement those visions. While one may not find 
10. Indeed, Gutmann finds American federalism particularly well suited to fostering demo-
cratic participation in the making of education policy. Local public schools under the control of 
elected school boards can respond to the collective preferences of local communities. Such au-
thority permits more effective control, allows content to vary with area preferences, and facili-
tates citizen participation. At the same time higher levels of government can set limits on local 
authority in order to cultivate a common societal culture, teach democratic values, and insure 
that local preferences are nonrepressive and nondiscriminatory. Professional authority may be 
exercised through the pressure of teacher's unions. Unions can demand conditions under which 
teachers are better able to develop democratic character. There is room as well for student par-
ticipation which itself can foster the participatory virtues of democratic character. 
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such a consequence troubling, it is naive to assume that such a result 
would be the product of a neutral process. 
- Jonathan Marks 
